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AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

RING ROADS OF RESOURCES

by

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A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

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March 2010

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Abstract

Using stability and reconstruction operations as a test case, the US government can improve its interagency cooperation by forcing its agencies to work together in the development of the continual chain that links strategy to resourcing. For the purposes of this paper, this hypothesis will be investigated using the two Departments most intricately linked to national security, and global stability and reconstruction programs, State and Defense. Ultimately, the goal is to identify a process that will not only lead to the best possible allocation of government funds and manpower to optimize stability and reconstruction operations within available resources, but also to apply this process across the entire national security spectrum to optimally link the ends, ways and means in a Whole of Government approach.

A series of recommendations are provided, ranging from options that could start tomorrow to those that require significant Congressional intervention. In all cases, the desired end states are the same: improved coordination and cooperation across USG agencies resulting in better operational results in global engagements.

“Despite improvements in recent years, America’s interagency toolkit is a “hodgepodge of jerry-rigged arrangements constrained by a dated and complex patchwork of authorities, persistent shortfalls in resources, and unwieldy processes.”

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Feb 2010

Much is written about the need for improved interagency cooperation, but in the end, all “Ring Roads” lead back to resources. Succinctly--and more eloquently phrased, the current US government budgeting process “lacks a rational basis of tying resource allocation decisions to national security strategy objectives.”¹ However, this disconnect can *and must* be remedied. By reviewing the current processes used by the Departments of State (DoS) and Defense (DoD), as well as how present field operations are working through resourcing concerns, we can identify the best practices, overlaps, and lessons to develop and institutionalize a Whole of Government budgeting process for national security. Given the daunting nature of this undertaking, a portion of the current national security budget already influenced by several Departments—stability and reconstruction programs—is an ideal starting point for this resourcing overhaul. Expanding the current NDAA Sections 1207 and 1210 programs² into a more formal process would compel improved coordination between the agencies, force hard choices to be made at both the Department and Congressional levels, and inject accountability into resourcing.

Within government agencies, there is significant in-fighting among components for priorities in a resource-constrained environment. When viewed across agencies, resource imbalances often become inexplicable at best, and, at worst, egregiously misappropriated when aligned to published national security end states. Using lessons from both the DoS and the DoD’s current statutory processes, a comprehensive budgeting system should be developed and implemented to ensure better allocation of means, and leading to an overall improved application of these resources. As preliminary examples, a combination of the current DoD budgeting system and the DoS strategic planning process could significantly advance interagency

coordination. The DoD developed a system that allows for program prioritization struggles to take place within the constraints of strategy, as well as resources. The Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process works across Service and Department agencies using methods such as the Program Budget Review (PBR) to develop a final, cohesive DoD budget based on overall strategy. However, this strategy, as outlined in the *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)*, is less frequently updated than in other agencies. By contrast, the DoS attempts to update its strategic plan every two to three years and additionally completes regional strategies that delve further into specifics within the Department's strategy.

Using stability and reconstruction operations as a test case, the US government can improve its interagency cooperation by forcing its agencies to work together in the development of the continual chain that links strategy to resourcing. For the purposes of this paper, this hypothesis will be investigated using the two Departments most intricately linked to national security, and global stability and reconstruction programs, State and Defense. Ultimately, the goal is to identify a process that will not only lead to the best possible allocation of government funds and manpower to optimize stability and reconstruction operations within available resources, but also to apply this process across the entire national security spectrum to optimally link the ends, ways and means in a Whole of Government approach.

BACKGROUND

Currently, there is nothing in place in the interagency community that will allow these processes to take root. The interagency process lacks a formalized concept of operations, embraces varying regional and management structures, develops personnel differently and most critically, lacks an independent authority with the empowerment to make interagency decisions about resources.³ Following the Cold War, various Administrations and members of Congress

took steps to improve these processes. The most notable Administration contributions are PDD 25 and 56. Issued in 1994, PDD 25 began to address reforms in multilateral peace operations. PDD 56 implemented the “pol-mil” construct as a method for interagency interaction in complex contingency operations.⁴

For its part, Congress acted in recent years to encourage both civilian action in international operations, introducing the *Winning the Peace Act* in 2003⁵ and the *Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2008*. The 2008 Act was originally introduced in 2004; several Senators used its introduction to attempt to gain traction for a separate nation-building agency. The logic behind their assertions was that these roles and responsibilities would be lost within any pre-existing agency and that the holistic approach required denoted the requirement for a separate entity entirely.”⁶

For its part, the Department of Defense made an early attempt at addressing interagency concerns with JP 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations* in 1996.⁷ Since then, multiple Service and Joint publications have mentioned the need for and challenges of interagency operations. In 2007, DoD Directive 3000.05, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, culminated the current DoD strategy on interagency cooperation for these activities.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Strategic Planning

The current DoS Strategic Plan lays out the following overarching goals for the Department: Achieve Peace and Security; Advance Sustainable Development and Global Interests; Promote International Understanding; and Strengthen Diplomatic and Program Capabilities.⁸ Within these ambitious goals, more specific objectives are outlined, key USG agencies and programs

that cross-cut DoS actions are identified, and performance metrics are discussed. No funding requirements are tied to any of these goals, objectives or metrics.

While the DoS has not published a complete *Strategic Plan* since 2003⁹, the Department has more recently released region-specific strategies, notably the *Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy* in early 2010. Both documents refer to the DoD as a “key USG partner;” however, not to the level one might expect given the amount of cooperation required between the two Departments around the world. For example, as noted above, the DoS *Strategic Plan* identifies its USG partners and cross-cutting programs for each of its goals. Surprisingly, the DoD is not identified as having any role in DoS’s strategy for such objectives as Counterterrorism, Democracy and Human Rights, or Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. Even ignoring current conflicts that consistently force the two Departments to cooperate on these matters, considering the degree to which the DoD integrates with country Chiefs of Mission at the Geographic Combatant Command level, these omissions seem severe and an affront to national security collaboration. The *Afghanistan/Pakistan* regional-specific plan is more collaborative in nature, and Secretary Clinton specifically addresses the need for a Whole of Government approach in her cover letter¹⁰; however, it is still quite limited in cross-Department discussions. Noteworthy interagency mentions are made regarding the establishment of USAID flexible funding authorities within the military Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) structure, and increasing overall civilian presence throughout the region.

The recently created Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability (S/CRS) established its own four-step strategic planning process¹¹ that places significant emphasis on an integrated Whole of Government approach to stability and reconstruction operations around the world. The process supports decision-making at all levels, from Washington to specific

countries, and its Situation Analysis and Interagency Implementation Planning steps mandate cross-agency discussions using the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) and the Interagency Management System (IMS).¹² The ICAF is introduced during the Situation Analysis planning and ideally results in USG solutions informed by all governmental agencies as well as non-USG experts potentially involved in the conflict resolution. The IMS is designed to provide a “common operating picture” for all USG and NGO participants in the stability and reconstruction mission, at country level and above.¹³ Using this framework, the DoS, and specifically S/CRS, has made significant strides in establishing a WoG approach to stability and reconstruction strategic planning . If the other Departments, agencies, and NGOs embrace their responsibilities as participants in this process, stability and reconstruction activities could prove an exemplary microcosmic example for national security strategic planning as a singular process.

Budgeting

As an example of how DoS connects strategy to resources, the *Afghanistan/Pakistan* regional plan does begin to address specific funding requirements for program implementation, ultimately requesting approximately \$10B in FY10 funds and prior year obligations.¹⁴ However, within these funding charts, the dollar amounts are often vague, seemingly indiscriminate, and without regard to realistic timetables. As a point of comparison, the level of clarity is nowhere near that found in a DoD Service-level Posture Statement for resource requirements.

The Department of State submits a budget request annually, and only for the upcoming fiscal year. For example, the FY10 budget was submitted in February 2009, in preparation for the FY10 that began in October 2009.¹⁵ As such, the Department’s process is purely budgetary; no programming for out years is included or anticipated. Furthermore, the budget does not appear

to be particularly tied to the DoS strategic goals, likely due to the contrasting timeframes of development.

Specifically, in the FY10 budget request, the DoS asked for a 12% increase over FY09 funding levels¹⁶ for a total of \$16.4 billion. This increase was due, in large part, to the anticipated growth in funding and manpower requirements for the Civilian Stabilization Initiative, or the Civilian Response Corps (CRC). The FY10 request funds 1,000 first-responder positions towards an ultimate goal of 4,250 total civilian responders, with a corresponding \$323M in increased funding. However, this funding level still leaves the fledgling agency under-resourced for the complete assumption of the stabilization and reconstruction mission from the DoD.¹⁷ The expected total *annual* requirement for the development and full implementation of the CRC is estimated at \$2 billion¹⁸; budget requests are still far from reaching these resourcing levels. In fact, given that the annual budget for the DoS hovers around \$15B annually, funding this agency in longevity will increase the entire Department top line by 13%, a significant pill for Congress to swallow.

In addition to the expansion of the CRC, substantial portions of the DoS budget request are allocated for ongoing stability and reconstruction operations, notably in Afghanistan and Iraq. These requests are likely to be augmented by Supplemental requests, as done in previous years. For example, DoS requested approximately \$2.4 billion in FY09 Supplemental Appropriations from Congress, including \$142 million for ongoing operations in Afghanistan.¹⁹

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Strategic Planning

The *QDR* updates the DoD's strategic direction every four years and is used as a guideline for the next several Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) iterations as well as Geographic

Combatant Command (GCC) and Service-specific planning. The 2010 document focuses on four overarching goals: Rebalancing the Force; Taking Care of Our People; Strengthening Relationships; and Reforming How We Do Business. Each goal is further broken down into specific initiatives and expected outcomes throughout the document.

Following release of the document--and often long before the *QDR* is officially released--Joint documents are molded by the strategy, including the *Guidance for the Development of the Force* and *Guidance for Employment of the Force*. More significantly, Joint Staff processes are greatly steered by the *QDR*. Strategically, TANKs, Defense Senior Leader Committees (DSLCL), Deputies Advisory Working Groups (DAWG), and Joint Requirements Oversight Committees (JROC) will make Department-level decisions based, in large part, on *QDR* direction, often on resourcing prioritization during PBR. These same governing bodies develop and approve the *QDR* from inception to signature, thus ensuring that the strategic planning process is intricately linked to the PPBE process, and ultimately tying resource decisions to strategic foresight. Of strategic note, the 2010 *QDR* dedicates a significant portion of the document to the discussion of *Strengthening Interagency Partnerships*, and calls for the development of the CRC and an “improved interagency strategic planning process that makes optimal use of all national instruments of power.”²⁰

Budgeting

Development of the FYDP is influenced by the *QDR* at all levels, from Service and GCC program submissions to the Department-wide PBR process that validates these requirements and develops the overall DoD program for the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) cycle. DoD capability portfolios, the mechanism by which programming elements are identified and tracked throughout the entire programming cycle, are identified and adjusted according to *QDR*

priorities, initiatives, and imperatives. Integrated Priority List (IPL) submissions from the GCCs are vetted and defended *or negated* at the Department level using *QDR* strategy.

The FY11 DoD budget request submitted in February 2010 built on the FY10 POM and budget submission²¹ and asked for \$548.9 billion in the baseline budget. As per previous submissions, the proposal included separately the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) supplemental request for ongoing operations in Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan. OCO requests for FY11 total almost \$160B to date.²² While the DoD budget request is designed to materially implement *QDR* goals, it also outlines four specific priority defense objectives that were used to prioritize and appropriately balance limited resources: (1) Prevail in today's wars; (2) Prevent and deter conflict; (3) Prepare for a wide range of contingencies; and (4) Preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer Force.²³ Notably, it also addresses the need for improved Unity of Effort with other USG agencies.

Much is made of the disparity among Departments regarding annual budgets, the comparison often made between DoS and DoD funding levels. For example, with the FY11 budget request, the DoD asked for 33 times that requested by the DoS. However, much of the baseline budgets for both Departments are tied to institutional or Congressionally-mandated requirements that do not fluctuate from year to year. In the DoD's case, the largest static portion of the budget is in personnel entitlements. Moreover, while the discretionary spending amounts are limited for both Departments, it is especially true for the DoD that programs for six-year periods and enters into extensive and legally-binding acquisition contracts. Therefore, a more accurate comparison between the two agencies would be the percentage increases for each agency in a given year, as it best illustrates the discretionary portions. Additionally, given that the DoS only budgets annually, perhaps the best comparison is the DoS percentage increases to the DoD OCO

percentage change (since OCO is one of the few aspects of the DoD budget that is on a single-year basis). Appendix 1 outlines these percentage changes. While the DoS has experienced double-digit growth over each of the last few years, DoD's top line is hovering at nominal increases in real-growth²⁴, and its OCO funding is actually decreasing when viewed over time. This implies that funds are appropriately shifting as the security situation improves on the ground.

Additionally, DoD stability and reconstruction resources are sprinkled throughout the FY11 budget request to Congress. To support the build-up of troops in Afghanistan, \$33 billion is requested in the FY11 OCO Supplemental Appropriations submission, partially to continue building the capacity of the Afghan government, specifically through its security forces (\$11.6 billion).²⁵ An additional \$2 billion is requested to do the same in Iraq.²⁶ The Department also asked for \$1.3 billion to continue funding the Commanders' Emergency Response Program (CERP) across the theaters of operations.

While not specifically addressed in DoD's budget request, the resulting NDAA from Congress will likely include further Section 1210 funds that allow for the transfer of dollars between DoD and DoS to support stability and reconstruction operations. Specifically, in the NDAA for FY10, Section 1210 funds were limited to support of the State Partnership Program, and decentralized the approval of funds transfers to the joint endorsement of the combatant commander and chief of mission affected. Interestingly, the FY10 NDAA also included in Section 1222, which extended CERP for a year, a caveat that would allow the Secretary of Defense to transfer CERP dollars to the Secretary of State in support of the Afghanistan National Solidarity Program as he deemed necessary to enhance stability operations. Each year, Congress has enhanced the NDAA's treatment of stability and reconstruction operations, increasing the

flexibility of funds transfers between the Departments of State and Defense specifically. This indicates a proclivity to institutionalize a more fluid funding process, and opens the door to increased interagency cooperation, planning and budgeting for contingency operations.

“REAL WORLD” CURRENT OPERATIONS

Situations on the ground often differ from what is theorized in Washington, and stability and reconstruction operations are no different. Agencies assigned to PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan are working together to accomplish the mission, using innovative approaches that exploit the strengths of whichever USG “boss” can prove most helpful. Across all combatant commands and their corresponding DoS chiefs of mission counterparts, Congressional efforts have made a substantial impact in appropriately shifting funds between the DoS and DoD. As discussed briefly above, Sections 1207 and 1210 of the NDAA have added significant resourcing flexibility for interagency operations around the globe.

More explicitly, successful stability and reconstruction programs have been established in 19 countries since Section 1207 funding became available in FY06.²⁷ Two notable examples are programs in Colombia and Haiti. In Colombia, government efforts in the Macarena region—an area of the country recently freed from control by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—were bolstered by stability funds transferred from DoD to DoS. Essential services were provided to civilians in the region, helping ensure the citizens’ loyalty to the legitimate Colombian government.²⁸ In Haiti, a 1207 funds transfer resulted in the Haiti Stabilization Initiative, res-establishing police presence in the nation’s slums and creating job opportunities through infrastructure projects. In the wake of the recent earthquake, no doubt additional funds transfers have occurred in the region. In addition to these examples, fund transfers between Defense and State of approximately \$110 million also supported stability programs in Nepal,

Lebanon, Somalia, Yemen, and countries in Trans-Sahara Africa and Southeast Asia in FY06 and FY07.²⁹

RECOMMENDATIONS

The problems faced by the US government today are larger than any single Department can address, particularly in the national security arena. While current global engagements have resulted in a patchwork remedy for interagency tensions and resource disparities in stability and reconstruction programs, more permanent solutions are needed to institutionalize processes and create synchronized WoG approaches to national security dilemmas at large. Using the lessons learned from SSTR operational successes, as well as best practices from DoS and DoD, strategic planning and budgeting can be improved across USG agencies. Moreover, an integrated interagency approach to planning and budgeting will ensure that national security concerns are addressed, and that critical components of a comprehensive strategy are not missed during a single Department's review.

As with any significant change to USG operations, Congressional action and oversight will be required to mandate change, especially given the quantity of resources involved in national security and, on a much smaller but still significant scale, stability and reconstruction operations. As such, it is best to start the transition with small changes using existing doctrine and processes and build on those successes to achieve more permanent fixes. This methodology will allow for improved interagency interactions while minimizing the bureaucratic quagmire. As synergies and successes are realized, it will likely prove easier to extract improved national guidance and direction from the National Security Council. Finally, as needed, significant legal action can be taken by Congress, such as the passage of a Goldwater-Nichols II Act to force interagency coordination and cooperation. This three-tiered approach is outlined in the

recommendations below, once again using stability and reconstruction operations as the USG microcosm that can later be expanded to include the plans and budgets for all national security objectives.

Start Small

Identify SSTR PECs: As evidenced by the successes of Section 1207 and 1210 funding transfers, the DoD and DoS are realizing that resources should be fungible to optimize their use in interagency operations. More flexible funding options can be identified if the current use of resources is better tracked. What's more, by identifying which agency is spending which monies and for what, a better initial allocation of resources can be divvied out between the Departments. A relatively simple first step would be to identify the program element codes (PECs) used by DoS and DoD for stability and reconstruction operations. This is similar to the way DoD currently bins its PECs in specific capability portfolios. Right now, DoD can track the amount spent on, for instance, Force Application or Joint Network Operations, as defined by the Department. The DoD and DoS could work together to establish a list of programs that fall within a newly created Stability portfolio, easily tracked within the Department, by interagency working groups, or by Congress for resourcing trends.

Institutionalize Sections 1207/1210: As alluded to several times in this paper, institutionalizing the NDAA Sections 1207/1210 process makes sense given the program's successes. First, the funding amounts given annually to DoD for possible reallocation under these programs should be permanently transferred to the DoS coffers. Second, a set amount should be allocated by Congress each year of established fungible funds that can be transferred between Departments as needed and per interagency agreement for stability operations. This would further increase the

flexibility between Departments, ultimately improving interagency cooperation and communication.

Use the Best of Both Worlds: The DoS and DoD bring different approaches and strengths to any global engagement, and the same is true for their Washington processes. By integrated the best of each Department's practices, a stronger interagency process for conducting stability and reconstruction operations is realized. The DoS strengths lie in the interagency strategic planning process outlined by S/CRS; the DoD brings a strong programming and budgeting process that looks out into the future several years to ensure the best possible allocation of limited resources. Further, the DoD's budget is heavily influenced by its strategic guidance; this would serve an integrated SSTR process as well.

Embrace Existing Doctrine: The US Institute of Peace recently published the *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*. This book was developed based on "a comprehensive review of major strategic policy documents...and consultations with dozens of major (USG, NGO, and international) institutions."³⁰ While self-admittedly not comprehensive, it makes significant headway in identifying ways for the interagency process to work in stability and reconstruction operations. If adopted by the DoS, DoD and other agencies, it could prove invaluable in the development of official Department or interagency doctrine. Additionally, current S/CRS policies and Joint and Service doctrine address specific SSTR concerns, operations and interagency cooperation. These documents could be used to develop interagency-wide policies and procedures.

Improve National Guidance

Follow Existing Presidential Direction: The 2010 *QDR* addresses the Presidential strategic communication initiative as the foundation for future interagency cooperation.³¹ The initial

findings of this strategic communication interagency working group were released in March 2010 and call for better allocation of resources, the expedition of increased civilian agency capabilities, and the streamlining or elimination of repetitious programs.³² The initiatives focus on improving the quality and synchronization of public diplomacy and strategic messages³³, and its imperatives sound strikingly similar to what one might expect from a similar review of SSTR processes across the WoG. Further, the DoD representative to the working group is the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the same individual responsible for SSTR coordination among Departments.

Increase NSC-Oversight: The Center for Strategic and International Studies report conducted in 2005 on interagency cooperation recommended a more active role for the NSC, with the intent to ensure “Presidential intent is realized through USG actions.”³⁴ Furthermore, cooperation and guidance from the highest levels of government leadership would ensure commonalities exist within the Departments. As examples of how this could work using recommendations already discussed above, SSTR PECs could be identified for implementation and interagency doctrine could be disseminated through USG agencies. Roles and responsibilities for each agency could be more clearly delineated, and resources appropriated allocated based on these mission requirements. Ultimately, the NSC could act as a champion for the global range of stability and reconstruction programs with Congress, ideally resulting in increased funding for these operations.

Mandate Interagency Training: Personnel are critical to the success of any initiative; as such, efforts should be undertaken to ensure buy-in of interagency cooperation among the individuals who will have to carry out its policies. Exchange programs, exercises, and training opportunities that cross-cut USG agencies can forge relationships and increase cooperation.

Establish a Quadrennial National Security Review: Numerous articles, reports and reviews on the interagency process advocate the establishment of a *Quadrennial National Security Review*, similar to the *QDR* accomplished by DoD. This comprehensive strategic guidance would communicate the national security objectives and the capabilities required to achieve them, as well as “direct the NSC and other agencies to undertake specific activities, including the formulation of capabilities guidance and baseline (resource) requirements documents, as well as the development of interagency concepts of operations.”³⁵ As a starting point, a similar document that only addressed stability and reconstruction concerns could be published for interagency review and implementation, and ultimately expanded to include WoG national security requirements.

Establish New USG Structures to Enhance Interagency Cooperation

Create Single Agency for SSTR Operations: It is the opinion of this author that any attempts to allow Congress to mandate interagency cooperation through new agencies or directors will only result in an additional layer of bureaucracy and minimal improvements in cooperation. That said, Congress has set precedent in recent years for significant revisions or the creation of entirely new government agencies, most notably the Department of Homeland Security and Director of National Intelligence.³⁶ Furthermore, the establishment of a single civil-military agency responsible for SSTR operations with a single budget and under singular civilian leadership would ensure civilian control of these stability programs.³⁷

Appoint Interagency “Czar”: This is a slightly less ambitious approach to the above option, while still achieving similar results. This individual would be responsible for coordinating interagency operations, initially in the SSTR realm. In order to have any effectiveness, he would

have to be given official authorities, most notably regarding the allocation of resources for SSTR operations among the different USG agencies.

Pass Goldwater-Nichols II: The passage of a Congressional Act that mandated and enforced interagency cooperation to the extent that Goldwater-Nichols forced joint collaboration is a feasible option, albeit an extreme one, given that the individual USG agencies would likely fight its enactment. However, the synergies it would bring likely outweigh the initial problems with Congressional passage. As with the first Goldwater-Nichols Act, cross-agency organizations and cooperation would likely increase, and as such, the strategic planning and budgeting processes would better integrate across the WoG. The Act would enable the interagencies to start fresh regarding the allocation of roles, responsibilities and resources and enable a “bottoms-up” review of requirements to eliminate redundancies, improve synergies, and embrace efficiencies. Furthermore, the NSC and other integrative structures would strengthen in influence, minimizing the roles of the individual Departments and agencies.³⁸ In fact, the creating of a Goldwater-Nichols II would likely result in the implementation of many of the recommendations discussed above and is the best option to ensure a cohesive and comprehensive SSTR, and eventually, a grand national security strategy for the United States.

OUTCOMES

Whichever recommendations are undertaken to improve the interagency processes for SSTR operations, the desired end states are clear: improved coordination and cooperation across USG agencies resulting in better operational results in global engagements. Enhanced resourcing processes and allocation decisions should result in increased fiscal responsibility across government agencies. Further, appropriately re-prioritizing stability and reconstruction resources across Departments will allow for the more responsive application of these funds and

manpower. Proper resource allocation will also stymie allegations across Departments regarding mission responsibility and increase the application of performance-based outcomes. Stability and reconstruction capability gaps can be more quickly identified and remedied. Ultimately, the interests of the US can be better served through improved engagements with weak and failing states, and a precedent can be set for expanding the SSTR interagency process to incorporate all national security objectives.

¹ Said, Sami and Holt, Cameron. “A Time for Action: The Case for Interagency Deliberate Planning,” *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, Fall 2008, 53.

² NDAA Sections 1207 and 1210 fall under a greater range of NDAA authorities covered in Sections 1206 – 1225 began with the FY2006 NDAA and have been expanded and adjusted with each consecutive NDAA. These sections authorize funding transfers between the Departments of State and Defense regarding stability and reconstruction operations, dependent on which Department should perform tasks at a given time or geographical area, depending on capabilities required. Current Sections deal predominantly with Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. In FY2006, the initial transfer amount was \$100M; transfers have since increased to approximately \$300M annually.

³ Desai, Sunil. “Solving the Interagency Puzzle,” *Policy Review*, February/March 2005, 58.

⁴ *ibid*, 60.

⁵ Ultimately, the *Winning the Peace Act* of 2003—designed to introduce reconstruction “czars” never made it past committee.

⁶ Hukill, Traci. “Congress Weighs Creating Nation-Building Agency,” *Government Executive*, 3 May 2004.

⁷⁷ Hamblet, William. “PDD 56 and Complex Contingency Operations,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Spring 2000.

⁸ US Department of State, *Strategic Plan*, 1-33.

⁹ The DoS *Strategic Plan* published in 2003 under Secretary Powell covers fiscal years 2004-2009.

¹⁰ US Department of State, *Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy*, cover letter.

¹¹ The four steps of this process are Situation Analysis, Policy Formulation, Strategy Development, and Interagency Implementation Planning.

¹² US Department of State, S/CRS Planners Course slides, *Understanding Conflict and the Importance of Assessment*.

¹³ US Department of State, S/CRS Planners Course slides, *Strategic Level Integration: Organization and Processes*.

¹⁴ US Department of State, *Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy*, Resource Requirements tabulation.

¹⁵ The FY11 DoS *Budget in Brief* was not available at the time of this paper from official DoS sources.

¹⁶ Appendix 1 illustrates funding levels for the DoS and DoD over the last several fiscal years, including a percentage increase/decrease over preceding years.

¹⁷ Hoekstra and Tucker. “Adjusting to Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations,” *Prism*, March 2010, 20.

¹⁸ Binnendijk and Cronic. “Through the Complex Operations Prism,” *Prism*, December 2009, 17.

¹⁹ US Department of State, *FY10 Budget in Brief*, 8.

²⁰ US Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review*, February 2010, 71.

²¹ Even though the DoD develops its program for a six-year period, it submits it to Congress one year at a time, in February of the year preceding the start of the submitted fiscal year. However, Congress has visibility into the entire FYDP.

²² US Department of Defense, *FY11 Budget Request*, February 2010, 1-1.

²³ Ibid, 2-2 – 2-3.

²⁴ Real-growth refers to the percentage growth over inflation. Inflation is normally estimated at 2-2.5% in government calculations. Therefore, any percentage under 2% is actually a decrease in real funding levels, as inflation is not covered.

²⁵ US Department of Defense, *FY11 Budget Request*, February 2010, 6-1 – 6-3.

²⁶ *ibid*, 6-5.

²⁷ Herbst, John. “Addressing the Problem of Failed States: A New Instrument,” *Prism*, December 2009, 25.

²⁸ *ibid*, 26.

²⁹ United States Senate, *Military Role in Foreign Policy* (Robert Perito, US Institute of Peace testimony), 31 July 2008.

³⁰ US Institute of Peace, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*, US Institute of Peace Press, 2009, 1-4.

³¹ US Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review*, February 2010, 26.

³² Sheikh, Fawzia. “White House Mulls Military, Civilian Strategic Communication Initiatives,” *Inside the Pentagon*, March 25, 2010, 6.

³³ *ibid*

³⁴ CSIS. *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols*, July 2005, 7.

³⁵ Flournoy and Brimley. “In Search of Harmony-Orchestrating the Interagency for the Long War,” *Armed Forces Journal*, July 2006, 2.

³⁶ Donley, Michael. *Rethinking the Interagency System*, March 2005, 1.

³⁷ Burke, Edward. “Leaving the Civilians Behind: The ‘Soldier-Diplomat’ in Afghanistan and Iraq,” March 2010, *Prism*, 42.

³⁸ Szanya, et al. *Integrating Civilian Agencies in Stability Operations*, RAND: Santa Monica, 2009, 123.

Appendix 1

Table 1				
DoS vs DoD Funding Levels FY08-FY11*				
\$M	FY08	FY09	FY10	FY11
DoS	12,684	14,504	16,389	-
DoD	667,000	667,000	693,000	708,000
*includes Supplemental funds				
Table 2				
DoS vs DoD Funding Levels FY08-FY11--% Increase*				
\$M	FY08	FY09	FY10	FY11
DoS	19%	13%	12%	-
DoD*	10%	0%	4%	2%
*includes Supplemental funds				
Table 3				
DoD Overseas Contingency Ops Funding FY08-FY11				
\$M	FY08	FY09	FY10	FY11*
	187,000	146,000	130,000	159,000
% Dec	11%	-28%	-12%	18%
*FY11 request includes dollars for Afghanistan surge				

These tables were created using information available in the US Department of State's *FY10 Budget in Brief*, released in February 2009, and the US Department of Defense's *FY11 Budget Overview*, released in February 2010. The Department of State *FY11 Budget in Brief* was not available.

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